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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Statutory caps on the amount of damages recoverable in various 
types of litigation are now common.  Courts and scholars alike have 
raised concerns about the constitutionality, fairness, and efficacy of such 
caps.1  In this article, I examine two procedural questions arising from 
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  J.D. Yale Law School; B.A. 
University of Virginia. 
 1. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice 
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 391 (2005) (discussing her empirical study that 
demonstrates that “the imposition of caps on noneconomic damages has no statistically significant 
effect on overall compensatory damages in medical malpractice jury verdicts or trial court 
judgments”); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the 
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (asserting that noneconomic damages caps may 
disproportionately affect women, children, and the elderly); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAl 37 (Harv. Univ. Press 1991) (arguing that medical malpractice statutory 
caps raise serious fairness concerns because caps reduce recoveries only for the most severely 
injured patients); Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative 
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345 (1995) (casting doubt on the constitutionality of 
statutory caps under the Seventh Amendment); Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
1
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the use of statutory caps.  First, how should a statutory cap affect judicial 
review of awards for possible excessiveness?  Second, when a 
legislature has imposed a total cap on a combination of different types of 
damages (such as on the total of punitive and compensatory damages or 
on the total of economic and noneconomic damages), how should courts 
allocate multiple awards to conform to the cap?  Courts have given a 
variety of answers to these questions. 
I contend that beyond imposing an absolute limit on plaintiff 
recovery, statutory caps should not alter normal judicial review of jury 
awards.2 Thus, a court should not be content to reduce an award to the 
statutory limit if that amount would otherwise be excessive on the facts 
of the case.  Nor should a statutory cap be treated as a benchmark from 
which courts recalibrate jury awards, with the statutory limit reserved for 
the most egregious cases.  With respect to multiple awards that exceed a 
total cap on different types of damages, I suggest that the appropriate 
way to conform multiple awards to the cap is to combine judicial review 
for excessiveness with plaintiff choice as to how to allocate the awards. 
II.  EXCESSIVENESS REVIEW 
Traditionally, courts have reviewed jury awards for whether they 
are excessive.3  A court may set aside an excessive award and order a 
new trial on the entire case or on damages alone.  Alternatively, the 
court may offer the plaintiff a remittitur, by which the court forces the 
plaintiff to choose between accepting a reduction of the excessive award 
or proceeding with a new trial.4  Courts have used a variety of 
 
Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. S. Ct. 2005) (holding that Wisconsin legislative cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases violated the equal protection guarantees of the Wisconsin 
Constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1066-81 (Ill. S. Ct. 1997) 
(invalidating statutory cap);. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 
1062, 1092-95 (Ohio S. Ct. 1999) (same); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 467-75 (Or. S. 
Ct. 1999) (same). 
 2. Although claims for damages may at times be tried to judges rather than juries, I will refer 
to “jury” awards throughout this article for ease of discussion. 
 3. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 153, 188-90 (1999) (discussing historical and modern standards and techniques for reviewing 
damages).  Legislatures may choose to specify the review standard for awards of damages.  For 
example, a New York statute mandates judicial review for whether a jury award “deviates 
materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”  N.Y. CPLR 5501(c), McKinney’s 
Consol. Laws 2006.  The United States Supreme Court characterized this statutory standard as 
“tightening the range of tolerable awards” from the former “shock the conscience” standard 
applicable in New York.  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 423-25 (1996). 
 4. See generally 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
59.13[2][g][iii][A], at 59-82 (3d ed. 1999).  The Supreme Court has held that under the Seventh 
Amendment, a federal court may not reduce outright a jury’s award of compensatory damages; 
2
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formulations to describe the excessiveness inquiry, such as whether the 
award is “grossly” excessive5  or “obviously unreasonable.”6 
Many courts have employed these review standards even when a 
statutory cap applies, and they accordingly have at times reduced awards 
to amounts below applicable caps.7  This is appropriate, for the mere 
enactment of a statutory cap does not mean that the legislature intended 
to restrict a court’s power to address excessive awards.  At the same 
time, a cap on the amount of recoverable damages should not be read as 
imposing a new standard for reviewing excessiveness.  The amount that 
the legislature has specified as the limit of recovery should not be a 
benchmark from which to reduce jury awards below the statutory 
maximum. 
Some courts, however, have departed from the notion that 
traditional excessiveness review survives the enactment of statutory 
caps.  In this part, I criticize the use of statutory caps as “floors” beyond 
which the judge may not reduce a jury’s award, and I challenge the use 
of statutory caps as guides for determining whether a jury award should 
be reduced below the statutory maximum. 
A.  Statutory Caps as “Floors” 
Rarely, a legislature may indicate that if a jury award exceeds the 
statutory cap, the court should reduce the award to the statutory 
maximum and no less.  In this sense, the statutory cap serves as a floor 
beyond which a judge may not reduce the jury’s award.  Consider a 
Kansas statute that limits noneconomic damages to $250,000 in personal 
injury actions.8  The statute provides that: “If the verdict results in an 
award for noneconomic loss which exceeds the limits of this section, the 
 
instead, the court must follow remittitur practice.  Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 
211 (1998) (per curiam); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 27-29 (1889).  Lower federal courts are 
divided on whether judges may reduce jury awards of punitive damages outright.  See Colleen P. 
Murphy, Judgment as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 TUL. L. REV. 459 (2000) 
(discussing cases and arguing that the Seventh Amendment does not permit outright reduction of 
punitive damages). 
 5. Dimick v. Shiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (stating judges may review jury awards to 
ensure that they are not “palpably and grossly inadequate or excessive”). 
 6. Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Nolan v. Tankoos, No. 9599, 1989 WL 646275 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1989) 
(reducing compensatory damages in personal injury case to less than the applicable malpractice 
cap); Velez v. Roche, 335 F. Supp.2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (reducing compensatory damages to 
applicable cap under Title VII and deciding that the capped amount was not excessive on the facts 
of the case). 
 8. K.S.A. § 60-19a02 (b) (2005). 
3
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court shall enter judgment for $250,000 . . . .”9  This statutory language 
led the Kansas Supreme Court to assert that the statute “insure[s] the 
injured plaintiff that the court will not exercise its discretion to award 
less than $250,000 when higher damages are awarded by the jury.”10  
Thus, the statute precludes excessiveness review that would result in an 
award below the statutory cap. The Kansas Supreme Court found that 
this protection for the plaintiff provided the necessary “quid pro quo” 
that, under the court’s precedents, avoided state constitutional 
problems.11  The Kansas scheme appears to be an outlier.  Most 
legislatures that enact caps likely do not wish to dispense with traditional 
excessiveness review that might result in a reduction of a jury award 
below the statutory maximum. Moreover, federal due process might be 
violated if a legislature enacts a cap but forbids excessiveness review of 
damages.12 
Even if a legislature has not precluded excessiveness review, a 
court might be tempted to reduce a jury award to the statutory maximum 
without further reflection on whether the statutory maximum would be 
an excessive amount under the individual circumstances of the case.  
Certainly, courts should tread cautiously in declaring jury awards to be 
excessive when the amount of damages is not susceptible to precise 
measurement.  Nonetheless, the presence of a statutory cap should not 
lead a court to ignore the possibility of an excessive jury award. 
B.  Statutory Caps as Benchmarks for Excessiveness Review 
Some courts have viewed statutory caps as guides for determining 
the upper limit of a reasonable jury award, with many of the cases 
 
 9. Id. at § 60-19a02 (d) (emphasis added). 
 10. Samsel v. Wheeler Transpt. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 558 (Kan. S. Ct. 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
 11. Id. at 557. 
 12. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 415 (1994) (holding that Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidated a provision of the Oregon Constitution that 
prohibited judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury “unless the court 
can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict”).  But cf. Lust v. Sealy, Inc. 383 
F.3d 580, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2004) (Judge Posner suggesting that: “The purpose of placing a 
constitutional ceiling on punitive damages is to protect defendants against outlandish awards. . . .  
That purpose falls out of the picture when the legislature has placed a tight cap on total, including 
punitive, damages and the courts honor the cap.”).  The Supreme Court has not addressed whether 
federal due process may be violated by excessive awards of compensatory damages, but at least one 
commentator has advocated that noneconomic compensatory damages be subject to due process 
review similar to that applicable to punitive damages.  See Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due 
Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 
(2003). 
4
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involving federal employment discrimination claims.13 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 authorizes plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages for violations of various employment discrimination statutes, 
including Title VII, but the Act has a sliding scale of caps on the total 
amount of compensatory and punitive damages that plaintiffs may 
recover.14  The caps are pegged to the number of employees working for 
the employer, with $300,000 as the highest cap.15  The Act expressly 
exempts awards of back pay from the caps, and the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the statute as not imposing caps on awards of front pay 
either.16 
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the 1991 Act indicates 
that the maximum statutory amounts should be reserved for the most 
serious cases.  Yet, some courts have reduced jury awards to amounts 
less than the statutory maximum on the notion that the maximum applies 
only to the most egregious cases.17 This interpretation, which is a 
minority view, means that jury awards that are reasonable under 
traditional review standards might be reduced to amounts less than the 
statutory cap.  The Seventh Circuit has been the leading proponent for 
treating statutory caps as benchmarks for excessiveness review.  In its 
most recent decision on the issue,  Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,18 the court, in an 
opinion authored by Judge Posner, explained:  
 
 13. See, e.g.,  Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2004) (reducing damages in Title 
VII case to amount below statutory cap because “[w]e are concerned that to uphold the award of the 
maximum damages allowed by the statute in a case of relatively slight, because quickly rectified, 
discrimination would impair marginal deterrence”); Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 
69 F.3d 1344, 1356 (7th Cir. 1995) (reducing jury’s award of punitive damages in Title VII action 
to less than the statutory maximum because the case was not “so egregious that an award at 100 
percent of what can legally be awarded . . . is appropriate”); Nyman v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 967 
F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D.D.C. 1997) (opining that the maximum amount recoverable under the 
applicable cap in a Title VII case “should be reserved for the most egregious cases of unlawful 
conduct”).  The rule announced by the district court in Nyman was rejected by the D.C. Circuit in 
Peyton v. DiMario.  287 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
  The discussion here of caps as a benchmark for excessiveness review draws in part on my 
earlier work in Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 153 , 
192-93 (1999). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). 
 16. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001) (holding that front 
pay is not covered by the 1991 Civil Rights Act caps because front pay does not constitute 
“compensatory damages” within the meaning of the statute). 
 17. See supra note 13. 
 18. 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004).  The Seventh Circuit had earlier indicated that a statutory 
maximum should be reserved for the most egregious cases.  Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm 
Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1356 (7th Cir. 1995) (commenting that case was not “so egregious 
that an award at 100 percent of what can legally be awarded . . . is appropriate”). 
5
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We are concerned that to uphold the award of the maximum damages 
allowed by the statute in a case of relatively slight, because quickly 
rectified, discrimination would impair marginal deterrence.  If 
[defendant] must pay the maximum damages for a relatively minor 
discriminatory act, it has no monetary disincentive . . . to escalate 
minor into major discrimination.  It’s as if the punishment for robbery 
were death; then a robber would be more inclined to kill his victim in 
order to eliminate a witness and thus reduce the probability of being 
caught and punished, because if the murdering robber were caught he 
wouldn’t be punished any more severely than if he had spared his 
victim.19 
It is questionable whether employers are tempted in the manner that 
Posner suggests.  The robbery analogy is overstated because the robber 
gains the chance at continued freedom when he kills the witness; unless 
the employer has a conscious preference to discriminate, it is not clear 
what the employer would gain from ratcheting up its discriminatory acts.  
The robber in Posner’s scenario knows in advance that there is one legal 
consequence for robbery–death–and the robber makes the decision to 
kill the witness based on that certain consequence.  By contrast, the 
employer knows far less in advance about the eventual legal 
consequences for discrimination.  A particular plaintiff’s remedy, 
beyond any back pay or front pay, can range from $0 to the capped 
amount.  Due to this range of possible liability, the employer has the 
incentive not “to escalate minor into major discrimination.”  Moreover, 
compensatory damages beyond back pay and front pay typically are a 
remedy for the plaintiff’s emotional distress; damages are thus highly 
specific to the individual plaintiff’s circumstances.  Although the 
employer may have been held liable for the statutory maximum in one 
case, the possibility exists that another act of discrimination will cause 
less harm to a different plaintiff.  As a result, a monetary incentive 
remains for the employer not to escalate minor into major 
discrimination.  Finally, awarding the maximum under a statutory cap 
would not “impair marginal deterrence” if additional sources of law, 
such as state law, afford plaintiffs the right to uncapped damages.20 
 
 19. Id. at 591. 
 20. For example, state or local law may provide a right to recover against an employer for 
discrimination, with no caps on recovery.  The possible result is that a plaintiff may recover up to 
the capped amount under Title VII, plus additional damages under local law.  See, e.g., Martini v. 
Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court should 
have reallocated the portion of Title VII damages above the statutory cap to employee’s recovery 
under District of Columbia law).  For further discussion of how courts allocate jury awards of 
damages between state and federal claims, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An 
6
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Several circuits have rejected the notion that the statutory 
maximum in the 1991 Civil Rights Act should be reserved for the most 
serious cases. 21  These courts have asserted that the statute does not 
create or imply a scale for damages and that recalibrating reasonable 
jury awards to amounts less than the statutory maximum would invade 
the province of the jury.22  Thus, these circuits have adhered to normal 
review standards.23 
Courts rejecting the benchmark approach have the better stance.  If 
a legislature has not indicated that a statutory maximum should be 
reserved for the most egregious cases, courts should reduce a jury award 
to an amount below the statutory cap only if the award is excessive 
under common law, statutory, or constitutional review standards.24  Mere 
enactment of a statutory cap does not indicate that the legislature sought 
to depart from otherwise applicable judicial review standards.  Rather 
than enact a cap, the legislature could have chosen to enact a schedule of 
damages assigning award levels to different types of plaintiff harm or 
defendant conduct. Courts that consider the statutory maximum to be 
 
Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 
(2006) (discussing how courts allocate damages between Title VII claims and state law claims and 
stating that “[m]ost courts have concluded that a district court has virtually unfettered discretion to 
allocate damages between federal and state claims.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“The statutory cap is not the limit of a damages spectrum, within which the judge might recalibrate 
the award given by the jury. . . . To treat it as such would be to invade the province of the jury.”); 
Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2nd Cir. 1997) (“Nothing in the language of the statute 
suggests that the cap on damages is intended to diminish the jury’s role in assessing punitive 
damages or to alter the standard for judicial review of such awards. . . . The statutory limitation is 
not an endpoint of a scale according to which judges might recalibrate jury awards.”).  See also 
Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  In Peyton, the majority stated: 
It may well be that in the most egregious conceivable case a jury might award, for 
example, $300,000,000, which would be reduced to $300,000.  The fact that some other 
hypothetical case might be only half as egregious (assuming such comparisons can be 
made) would not require either the trial or appellate court to reduce the award in that 
hypothetical case from $150,000,000 to $150,000. 
Id. at 1127. 
 22.  Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Peyton, 287 F. 3d at 1127 (“[T]he proper approach is to determine whether the 
judgment awarded, regardless of whether it is the statutory maximum, is supported by evidence, and 
does not shock the conscience, or is not inordinately large so as to be obviously unreasonable.”); 
Deters, 202 F.3d at 1273 (“[O]nly when an award would “‘shock the judicial conscience, and 
constitute a denial of justice,’ for example because it would ‘result in the financial ruin of the 
defendant’ or ‘constitute a disproportionately large percentage of a defendant’s net worth,’” will we 
reduce the award below the statutory cap.”) (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 
(2nd Cir. 1997); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 617 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that punitive 
damages should be reduced below maximum allowed under the statutory cap only if award is 
unreasonable or shocks the conscience). 
 24. See supra note 3. 
7
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reserved for the most serious cases are in essence transforming the cap 
into an implied schedule of damages.  This goes far beyond what the 
legislature provided in enacting a statutory cap—that certain losses or 
wrongs should not be remediable beyond a specified sum. 
III.  ALLOCATING MULTIPLE AWARDS SUBJECT TO A TOTAL CAP 
A legislature may impose a cap on a combination of different types 
of damages, such as on the total of economic and noneconomic 
damages, or on the total of compensatory and punitive damages.25  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, with its total cap on compensatory and 
punitive damages, is one illustration.  State examples include a Virginia 
statute that imposes a $1.5 million cap on the total of compensatory and 
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases,26 and a Louisiana statute 
that imposes a $500,000 cap on economic and noneconomic damages in 
cases of medical malpractice.27  When actual awards on different types 
of damages are combined and exceed the cap, the court must make a 
reduction to conform to the cap.  
This part explores the consequences to the litigants of how a court 
decides to make the reduction, and it sketches the various approaches 
that courts have taken to allocating awards under a total cap.  I will then 
develop the argument that the best way to conform multiple awards to a 
total cap is to combine judicial review for possible excessiveness with 
the plaintiff’s choice as to how to allocate multiple awards. 
A.  Consequences for Litigants of Allocations Under a Total Cap 
In theory, the post-cap amount awarded the plaintiff should be the 
same regardless of how the court decides to adjust multiple awards to 
conform to the total cap.  Nonetheless, the allocation of compensatory 
and punitive damages (or of economic and noneconomic damages) can 
have significant consequences for the litigants.  For example, a plaintiff 
who receives “damages . . . on account of personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness” is subject to federal taxation on any punitive 
damages, but not on compensatory damages.28  Moreover, awards of 
punitive damages generally are subject to more intensive appellate 
 
 25. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.8, at 524 (2d ed. 1993) (citing statutes 
that cap total recovery against certain kinds of defendants). 
 26. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15 (2004). 
 27. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.42 B(1) (2001). 
 28. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/6
MURPHYFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:33:24 AM 
2006] STATUTORY CAPS 1009 
review than awards of compensatory damages.29 These factors might 
lead a plaintiff to prefer that compensatory damages comprise most, if 
not all, of the post-cap award.  The defendant, too, may prefer that 
compensatory damages be applied fully against the total cap if the 
defendant’s liability insurance does not cover punitive damages.30  
Variables affecting either litigant’s preferred allocation between 
different types of damages might include the possibility of prejudgment 
interest as to some or all of the awards,31 any applicable discounting to 
present value,32 and any offset of benefits from collateral sources.33 
In the few reported decisions adjusting damages to conform to total 
caps (all involving caps on the combination of compensatory and 
punitive damages), courts have not discussed these practical 
consequences.  Moreover, some of these courts apparently have not 
denominated which portion of the post-cap award comprised 
compensatory or punitive damages.34  It would seem, however, that for 
 
 29. For example, appellate courts must review de novo a trial court’s determination whether a 
punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool 
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001). 
 30. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(g) (discussing express 
exclusion of punitive damages from some liability policies and split in authority as to whether 
punitive damages are covered in the absence of an express exclusion); Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409, 419-34 (2005) (discussing 
current state of law on insurability of punitive damages). 
 31. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 25, § 3.6(4) at 356-57 (noting that prejudgment interest 
generally is not applicable to awards for pain and suffering or mental anguish or to punitive 
damages, but that some statutes allowing prejudgment interest arguably encompass such awards). 
 32. Cf. 2 DOBBS, supra note 25, § 8.5(3) at 468 (noting traditional rule that damages for 
future pecuniary losses are discounted to present value and that courts are divided as to whether 
discounting to present value should apply to pain and suffering or punitive damages).  Courts vary 
as to whether the judge or jury should determine the discount rate.  See id. at 572 (citing cases); 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Ageloff, 552 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. S. Ct. 1989) (involving jury 
determination of discounting); McCrann v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 803 F.2d 771, 774-76 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(instructing trial judges to discount at 2 percent unless one of the parties proves a more appropriate 
rate). 
 33. Cf. 2 DOBBS, supra note 25, § 8.6(3) at 500 (noting complexities when defendant is 
entitled to both a collateral source credit and a cap on damages). 
 34. In cases involving punitive and compensatory damages under the caps in the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, some courts have simply entered judgment for the capped amount and not designated 
which portion of the judgment represents either compensatory or punitive damages.  See, e.g., Quint 
v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 14 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (asserting that statutory language 
providing for caps in the Civil Rights Act of 1981 “neither contemplates nor requires” court to 
designate post-cap award as “being in the nature of ‘compensatory damages’”); Baty v. Willamette 
Indus., 985 F. Supp. 987, 998 n. 7 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that “[n]either in the statute nor in any 
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case is there authority mandating or permitting an allocation by the 
district court of the cap amount between compensatory and punitive damages”).  In Baty, the 
majority reduced the combined award at issue to $300,000.  Id. at 998.  The majority further 
indicated that if the appellate court were to deem allocation necessary, the trial judge would allocate 
9
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purposes of taxation and other practical consequences mentioned earlier, 
there may be instances in which courts should determine which portions 
of the post-cap award represent compensatory or punitive damages.35  In 
those cases in which the courts have designated whether the post-cap 
award comprised compensatory damages, punitive damages, or a 
combination of both, the courts have employed a variety of methods in 
making the allocations.  I now turn to a discussion of those various 
approaches. 
B.  Court Methods 
There is scant evidence in reported state decisions as to how courts 
make adjustments in multiple awards to comply with statutory caps.  
Several federal cases, however, have addressed the issue under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  With the statute failing to specify how a court is to 
conform a combination of compensatory and punitive awards to the total 
cap,36 courts have employed a variety of methods.  Some have applied 
compensatory damages first toward the statutory limit;37 one court has 
applied punitive damages first toward the cap;38 and others have sought 
to preserve some portion of both the compensatory and punitive 
awards.39  Courts have also taken different approaches as to the timing of 
excessiveness review.  Some courts have reviewed one or both of the 
awards for excessiveness and then allocated the awards under the cap,40 
while others have allocated the individual awards under the cap before 
reviewing for excessiveness.41 Some courts apparently did not review for 
 
$145,000 for compensatory and $155,000 for punitive damages.  Id. at n. 7. 
 35.  Similarly, when a total cap applies to the combination of economic and noneconomic 
damages, there may be practical reasons why courts should denominate which portion of the post-
cap award represents economic or noneconomic damages. 
 36. See Lust, 383 F.3d at 589 (“The statute does not prescribe a method for making this 
adjustment . . . .”); Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“The statute contains no command as to how a district court is to conform a jury award to the 
statutory cap.”). 
 37. See infra Part III(B)(1). 
  38. See infra Part III(B)(2). 
  39. See infra Part III(B)(3). 
 40. See, e.g., Quint, 172 F.3d at 13-15 (determining that jury award of punitive damages was 
reasonable and applying punitive damages against the total cap, leaving no room for compensatory 
damages); David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 185 F. Supp.2d 918, 926-27 (C.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 324 F.3d 
851 (7th Cir. 2003) (reducing compensatory award from $100,000 to $50,000 under common law 
review, then subtracting revised compensatory award from total cap amount of $300,000, then 
reducing punitive award to $250,000 to comply with cap and further reducing punitive award to 
$150,000 under “most egregious” standard). 
 41. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp.2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003), modified and aff’d, 
383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying pro rata approach and then reviewing each award for 
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excessiveness.42  I will examine the various allocation approaches in 
turn. 
1.  Apply Compensatory Damages First Toward the Total Cap 
Under an “apply compensatory damages first” method, if 
compensatory damages are less than the statutory limit, the court will 
reduce punitive damages to the difference between compensatory 
damages and the capped amount.43  If compensatory damages equal or 
exceed the statutory limit, then no punitive damages are awarded.44 
Some courts have justified this method as avoiding or mitigating 
issues related to punitive damages, such as whether the threshold 
requirements for an award of punitive damages were met or whether the 
punitive award was excessive.45  To the extent awards of punitive 
damages are deemed to raise thornier issues than compensatory awards, 
this reasoning has some force.  Judge Posner’s opinion in Lust advocated 
the “apply compensatory damages first” approach on a different 
rationale–that normally, “punitive damages are something added on by 
the jury after it determines the plaintiff’s compensatory damages.”46  
Even if Posner is correct in asserting that juries normally “add on” 
punitive damages after compensatory damages, it is unclear why the 
 
excessiveness); Goico v. Boeing Co., 358 F. Supp.2d 1028 (applying compensatory damages to cap 
and then reviewing for excessiveness; because compensatory damages exhausted the cap, court did 
not review punitive award). 
 42. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spencer Press, 364 F.3d 368, 377-78 (1st Cir. 2004); Hall v. 
Consolidated Freightways, 337 F.3d 669, 672-76 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 43. See, e.g., Hall, 337 F.3d at 671, 676 (jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and 
$750,000 in punitive damages; court assumed $2,400 of the compensatory award was for back pay 
and subtracted the remaining $47,600 from the applicable statutory cap of $300,000, leaving a 
punitive damages award of $252,400); EEOC v. CEC Entm’t, Inc., 2000 WL 1339288, 1 (W.D. 
Wis. 2000) (jury awarded $70,000 in compensatory damages and $13 million in punitive damages; 
court upheld compensatory award of $70,000 and reduced punitive award to $230,000 to comply 
with statutory cap). 
 44. See, e.g., Hogan v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1037 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Johnson, 364 F.3d at 377 (1st Cir. 2004); Goico, 358 F. Supp.2d 1028 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 45. See, e.g., Hogan, 61 F.3d at 1037 (reinstating the jury’s award of compensatory damages 
that was equal to the statutory cap, “thus obviating the need to reach the question of punitive 
damages”); Johnson, 364 F.3d at 377 (responding to defendant’s argument that punitive damages 
were not available as a matter of law by stating that “[t]he availability of punitive damages is not a 
live issue” because “the compensatory damages award was itself greater than the statutory cap”); 
Goico, 358 F. Supp.2d at 1032 (deciding that defendant’s challenge to amount of punitive damages 
was “moot” because compensatory damages award—deemed reasonable in amount—exhausted the 
statutory limit). 
 46. 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004).  The Seventh Circuit did not, however, conclude that the pro 
rata method used by the district judge was reversible error because the defendant did not on appeal 
challenge the pro rata approach.  Id. at 589. 
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order in which juries may deliberate should have any bearing on how 
judges should allocate multiple awards to comply with a cap.  Beyond 
the justifications that courts have offered for applying compensatory 
damages first toward a statutory cap, one might add the intuitive appeal 
of affording a plaintiff at least some amount of compensation for harm 
suffered. 
Courts applying compensatory damages first toward a statutory cap 
often have not indicated if or when they evaluated the compensatory 
award for possible excessiveness.47  It would make little sense, however, 
to apply the jury’s full compensatory award toward the statutory cap if 
the award was otherwise excessive.48 
2.  Apply Punitive Damages First Toward the Total Cap 
In one case, the First Circuit applied punitive damages against the 
capped amount, with the result that no compensatory damages were 
represented in the post-cap award.49  The jury had awarded 
compensatory damages equal to,  and punitive damages in excess of,  the 
applicable $300,000 total cap.  The district court then reduced the 
combined awards to the statutory limit and characterized the post-cap 
award as “compensatory damages.”50 The First Circuit disregarded the 
district court’s label, asserting that the statute “neither contemplates nor 
requires such a characterization” because the statute simply mandates 
that “the sum” of compensatory and punitive damages not exceed 
$300,000.51  (As I asserted earlier, however, there may be compelling 
practical reasons why courts should denominate which portions of the 
post-cap award represent compensatory or punitive damages).52 
The First Circuit found that the evidence supported the punitive 
damages award.  Because the punitive award exceeded the cap, the court 
concluded that “there is no need to revisit the compensatory damages 
 
 47. See, e.g., Johnson, 364 F.3d at 377-78;; Hall, 337 F.3d at 672-76.  But see Hogan, 61 F.3d 
at 1037 (appellate court reviewing full compensatory award for excessiveness after announcing that 
it would apply compensatory damages first against the cap). 
 48. Cf.  Lust, 383 F.3d at 589 (“[T]he sensible thing for the judge to do is . . . to determine the 
maximum reasonable award of compensatory damages, subtract that from [the applicable cap] and 
denote the difference punitive damages”); CEC Entm’t, 2000 WL 1339288 at 15 (determining that 
compensatory award was not excessive and then applying the compensatory award toward the total 
cap). 
 49. Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).  In Quint, the defendant had 
argued that the compensatory award for emotional harms was unreasonable.  Id. at 13-14. 
 50. Id. at 13-14 n. 9. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See supra Part III(A). 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/6
MURPHYFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:33:24 AM 
2006] STATUTORY CAPS 1013 
issue.”53  The court did not explain why it chose to apply punitive 
damages first against the statutory limit, although perhaps it was 
influenced by the fact that the defendant had challenged the jury’s 
compensatory award as unreasonable. 
Applying punitive damages first toward a statutory limit, with the 
result that the plaintiff’s recovery under the cap does not include any 
compensatory damages, seems odd.  A jury found the defendant liable to 
the plaintiff, and a necessary element of that liability may have been that 
harm was caused the plaintiff.  Yet, no portion of the adjusted award 
under the cap is deemed compensation for the plaintiff’s harm.  
Moreover, applying punitive damages first toward a total cap is in 
tension with the reality that compensation for harm to the plaintiff is the 
norm; punitive damages are the exception. 
3.  Preserve Both Types of Damages Under the Total Cap 
Some courts have sought to preserve both compensatory and 
punitive awards under a total cap. For example, in Jonasson v. Lutheran 
Child & Family Services,54 in which the jury awarded $200,000 in 
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, a district 
court within the Seventh Circuit reduced the compensatory award to 
$100,000 so as to preserve the full punitive award under the applicable 
$200,000 cap.55  Although admitting that the plaintiff’s losses arguably 
exceeded $100,000, the district court believed it “more appropriate to 
reduce [the plaintiff’s] compensatory damage award than to make any 
reduction in her punitive damage award in view of the evidence of 
defendant’s inadequate response to an egregious situation.”56  The 
Seventh Circuit in Jonasson approved the district court’s approach.57 
Another method for preserving both compensatory and punitive 
awards under a total cap is to reduce the awards pro rata.  Courts have 
split on whether a pro rata approach is a legitimate method for 
conforming awards to a total cap.  For example, in Lust, the federal 
district court used this method after the jury awarded $100,000 for 
emotional distress and $1 million in punitive damages.58  The plaintiff 
 
 53. See Quint, 172 F.3d. at 13-14. 
 54. Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 1996 WL 327965 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 115 
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs.,  115 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 58. Lust v. Sealy, 277 F. Supp.2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003), modified and aff’d, 383 F.3d 580 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
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argued that to comply with the applicable $300,000 cap, the court should 
reduce both awards by 73%, leaving approximately $27,000 for 
emotional distress and $273,000 in punitive damages.59  The defendant 
argued that the court should reduce punitive damages only, leaving 
emotional distress damages at $100,000.60  The plaintiff perhaps sought 
the pro rata reduction because she believed that the full $100,000 award 
for emotional distress would not be upheld by the court based on the 
facts of the case and on emotional distress awards in comparable cases.61  
The trial court followed the plaintiff’s suggestion for reducing pro rata, 
and it found that the reduced $27,000 compensatory award for emotional 
distress and the $273,000 punitive award were not excessive.62 
The Seventh Circuit, in Lust, objected to the trial court’s pro rata 
approach, and it expressed a strong preference for applying 
compensatory damages first toward a statutory cap.63  In this regard, the 
opinion in Lust seemed to contradict the earlier Seventh Circuit decision 
in Jonasson, which upheld the trial court’s reduction of compensatory 
damages so that the full punitive award could remain intact. 
Rather than remand to the trial court to implement the “apply 
compensatory damages first” approach, the Seventh Circuit in Lust 
accepted, with defendant’s assent, the trial court’s pro rata reduction of 
the compensatory and punitive awards.  The appellate court then 
proceeded to review each award for excessiveness.  The court upheld the 
pro-rata-reduced compensatory award of $27,000, but it declared the 
pro-rata-reduced punitive award to be excessive under the Seventh 
Circuit rule that the high range of a statutory cap should be reserved for 
the most egregious cases.64  The court deemed $150,000 to be the 
maximum permissible punitive award.65  The reduction of punitive 
damages to $150,000 meant that the plaintiff could have received the 
original compensatory award of $100,000 without exceeding the total 
 
 59. Id. at 996. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Indeed, the district court opinion stated that “plaintiff’s evidence of emotional distress is 
far from overwhelming,” and it noted awards in comparable cases that ranged from $40,000 to 
$50,000.  Lust, 277 F. Supp.2d at 997. 
 62. Id. at 996-99.  In following the plaintiff’s suggested pro rata approach, the district court 
stated: “In the absence of a compelling reason why the statutory cap should apply to one form of 
damages and not to another in a particular case, I see no reason why § 1981a(b)(3) should not be 
applied proportionally to both damages for emotional distress and punitive damages.”  Id. at 996. 
 63. 383 F.3d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 2004).  The Seventh Circuit did not, however, conclude that 
the pro rata method used by the district judge was reversible error because the defendant did not on 
appeal challenge the pro rata approach.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 589-91. 
 65. Id. at 591. 
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statutory cap of $300,000.  The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to 
adjust the compensatory award upwards from the pro-rata-reduced 
amount of $27,000, commenting that even that amount “seem[ed] 
high.”66  This raises a question, however, as to whether the trial court 
would have reached a different set of amounts if the case had been 
remanded for the trial court to perform excessiveness review in the first 
instance of the $100,000 compensatory award. 
A district court within the First Circuit also used the pro rata 
method.67 The jury awarded the plaintiff $200,000 each in compensatory 
and punitive damages.68  The applicable cap was $200,000, and the 
district court reduced the compensatory and punitive awards by 50%.69  
The First Circuit rejected this approach.  Although not directly 
criticizing the pro rata method, the First Circuit decided to reinstate the 
jury’s award of $200,000 in compensatory damages and vacate the 
award of punitive damages, “thus obviating the need to reach the 
question of punitive damages.”70 
If the goal is to reflect the jury’s judgment to the extent possible, 
then it would seem that a pro rata reduction of compensatory and 
punitive damages to comply with a total cap is superior to reducing only 
one of the awards.  The First and Seventh Circuits, however, in 
disfavoring the pro rata approach, apparently rejected this goal in favor 
of other considerations. 
In sum, the allocation of multiple awards to conform to a total cap 
may have significant consequences for the litigants.  The allocation may 
affect taxation and insurance, and it may have an impact on possible 
prejudgment interest, discount to present value, or offset of benefits from 
collateral sources.  In the reported cases, courts have not acknowledged 
these consequences.  Instead, the courts have employed a variety of 
approaches to conform multiple awards to total caps, with little 
explanation for why one approach is preferred over another. 
C.  A Proposal for Allocating Multiple Awards 
The general purpose of statutory caps is to limit plaintiff recovery 
or defendant liability;71 courts should resist extending the influence of 
 
 66. Id. at 589. 
 67. Hogan v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1037 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 68. Id. at 1036-37. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1037. 
 71. Some statutory caps appear to reflect more the notion that liability of defendants should 
be limited rather than the notion that harms to plaintiffs are unworthy of remedy beyond a certain 
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statutory caps beyond that purpose.  In the absence of statutory caps, 
juries typically have the initial job of assessing damages, judges have the 
authority to review jury awards for excessiveness, and plaintiffs are 
entitled to any awards that are authorized by law and not deemed 
excessive.     
I suggest that these traditional rules for damages should carry over 
as much as possible when a statutory cap applies and the sum of multiple 
awards exceeds the cap.  The best way to achieve this is a combination 
of excessiveness review and plaintiff choice as to how to allocate the 
awards.72  Because the defendant receives the benefit of the total cap 
regardless, it is appropriate that the plaintiff, who in the absence of the 
cap would have received a larger recovery, be afforded the choice of 
how to allocate.  The plaintiff is in the best position to decide how to 
maximize his or her ultimate recovery under the total cap in light of tax 
and other consequences. 
Whether excessiveness review by the court should precede the 
plaintiff’s choice of allocation or vice versa would depend on the 
circumstances of the individual case.  In some situations, it may be 
evident to the plaintiff how she would like to allocate the awards before 
the court engages in any excessiveness review.  Indeed, the plaintiff’s 
allocation choice may minimize the need for the court to review for 
excessiveness.  In other circumstances, such as when both jury awards 
separately exceed the statutory maximum, and the maximum reasonable 
amount of one or both of the awards likely is below the statutory limit, 
the judge should decide the maximum reasonable amount for the awards 
before the plaintiff chooses how to allocate. 
 
amount.  This focus on limiting defendant liability can be seen quite clearly with the caps in the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, the amounts of which vary depending on the size of the employer.  Some 
caps reflect more of a focus on limiting plaintiff recovery than on limiting individual defendant 
liability.  For example, some caps are pegged to the seriousness of the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff, and some limit the amount a plaintiff can recover against all defendants combined.  See 
Sharkey, supra note 1, at 498-500 (discussing recent malpractice legislation in several states).    
 72 Perhaps in some of the reported cases, courts did abide by the plaintiff’s choice (if any) as 
to how to allocate the awards, and the reported decisions simply did not so indicate.  But in at least 
one of the reported cases, the court clearly rejected the plaintiff’s choice and employed a different 
allocation approach.  Baty v. Willamette Indus. Inc., 985 F. Supp. 987, 998 n. 7 (D. Kan. 1997) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s request that the post-cap award should be comprised entirely of compensatory 
damages and stating that if an allocation “is deemed necessary and the jury awards remain 
unchanged after appeal, the court would allot $145,000 for compensatory damages and $155,000 for 
punitives”). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Statutory caps on damages have altered the traditional rule that 
plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of damages awarded by a jury, 
as long as those damages are not excessive on the facts of the case.  If a 
court treats the cap as a benchmark for reviewing awards for 
excessiveness, the court is implying a schedule of damages that the 
legislature has not chosen to enact.  Moreover, if the legislature has 
enacted a total cap on different types of damages, its purpose in limiting 
plaintiff recovery or defendant liability should be achieved in the way 
that least interferes with the traditional rule that the plaintiff is entitled to 
any nonexcessive damages that have been awarded.  Judicial review for 
possible excessiveness, combined with plaintiff choice as to how to 
allocate multiple awards to conform to the cap, serves legislative 
purposes while maximizing the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery. 
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